Lawrence Krauss and Richard Dawkins defend here the theory of “Epiphenomenalism” — the idea that there's no such thing as “consciousness” (and free will) that is independent from matter.
Karl Popper showed us that the theory of Epiphenomenalism makes no sense if it follows its own presuppositions: if my ideas cannot exist without a physical support, i.e., if my ideas are uniquely products of the chemistry of my brain — then it would not even be possible to discuss the issue regarding “Epiphenomenalism”: this theory (Epiphenomenalism) may not have any possibility to be true, because the eventual evidences that we make out of it are also pure chemistry; and if somebody defends a theory that is contrary to Epiphenomenalism, then he/she should also be correct, as his/her chemistry led him/her to a different conclusion.
Karl Popper calls this logical trap the “physical determinism nightmare”.
